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ARE WTO VIOLATIONS ALSO CONTRARY TO
THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT
OBLIGATIONS IN INVESTOR PROTECTION
AGREEMENTS?
Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.*
Bilateral investment treaties typically require the host state to ensure "fair
and equitable" treatment to the investors of the other state. While decisions
concerning fair and equitable treatment are often fact specific, three pending
NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations raise a novel legal variant of the following
issue: Is the breach of a WTO obligation that results in harm to a foreign
investor a denial of fair and equitable treatment?'
In Methanex v. United States, the investor argues that certain WTO
agreements require that "governmental measures cannot restrict trade any more
than necessary to achieve a legitimate state objective."2 Methanex goes on to
argue that this "least restrictive" principle as embodied in the WTO Agreements
is widely followed among civilized nations, and thus constitutes a part of
'customary' 'international law' 3 Finally, Methanex argues that the failure of
California to apply the "least restrictive" principle in banning a gasoline addi-
tive was a denial of fair and equitable treatment in violation of NAFTA Article
1105. 4
A slightly different argument is advanced in Canfor Corporation v. United
States, where the claimant contends that U.S. officials acted arbitrarily in failing
to follow WTO rulings concerning the calculation of dumping and counter-
vailing duties and that such action was a denial of fair and equitable treatment.5
In Kenex v. United States, the investor claims that the respondent failed to
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1. For an informed analysis of this issue, see Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor State
Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relieffor Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L.,
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2. Claimant Rejoinder 156, Methanex v. United States (2004). NAFTA Investor-State Arbitration
pleadings and decisions are available on the U.S. State Department, Office of the Legal Adviser website, at
http://www.state.gov./s/l/c3439.htm .
3. Claimant Rejoinder 57, Methanex.
4. Claimant Rejoinder 57, Methanex.
5. Statement of Claim 114, 122, 146-47, Canfor Corp. v. United States (2004),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/! 3203.pdf.
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follow the WTO rule of proportionality and consequently denied the investor
fair and equitable treatment.6
Since Methanex, Canfor, and Kenex are arbitrations pursuant to NAFTA
Chapter 11, the tribunals will have to take into account the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission ("FTC") "interpretation" that Article 1105 "prescribes the custo-
mary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to investorments of investors of another
Party."7 The interpretation also states that a "determination that there has been
a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1)."
Subsequently the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal in Mondev v. United States
observed that this interpretation "makes it clear that Article 1105(1) refers to a
standard existing under customary international law, and not to standards
established by other treaties of the three NAFTA parties.",
8
It is not necessary to wade into the debate whether the FTC Action was a
permissible "interpretation" of NAFTA or an unauthorized amendment, to con-
clude that it is likely that the Methanex, Canfor and Kenex tribunals will follow
the FTC rule.9 Even so, unless the tribunals somehow manage to dodge the
issue, the decisions in Methanex, Canfor and Kenex could reach beyond the
conclusions in the Mondev award and conclude that WTO obligations, or at
least those that are "norm-creating," have achieved the status of "customary
international law" and, therefore, indicate what protections derived from WTO
rules the "fair and equitable" treatment standard in Article 1105(1), as inter-
preted by the FTC, requires governments to afford investors protected by BITs.
It must be observed that giving investors the right or opportunity to
challenge WTO violations would be a radical departure from the normal rules
of WTO dispute resolution. Under those rules, only states can assert WTO
"rights." Individuals have no standing to request dispute resolution no matter
6. Notice of Arbitration E, § 5(iv), (v), Kenex, Ltd. v. United States (2002),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/13204.pdf.
7. Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of Certain Chapter 1 I Provisions (NAFTA Free
Trade Comm'n, July 31, 2001), www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf.
8. Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 121 (2002),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf.
9. Tribunals have generally followed the FTC guidance. Thus, in UPS v. Canada, the tribunal
accepted "that the obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment is not in addition to or beyond the
minimum standard." Award on Jurisdiction, United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada (2002), www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/jurisdication%20Award.22NOV02.pdf. Similarly, in Loewen v. United States,
the tribunal held that the "effect of the Commission's interpretation is that 'fair and equitable treatment' and
'full protection and security' are not free-standing obligations." Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 128, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/
22094.pdf. "They constitute obligations only to the extent that they are recognized by customary international
law." Id.
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how harmful the WTO violation is to their personal interests. Methanex,
Canfor, and Kenex, therefore, could open to investors' rights to compensation
that is not available to traders.
Since this is a novel and likely to be controversial issue, I propose to
venture into this subject by presenting for discussion the following hypothetical
involving the imaginary Republic of Tremex. In anticipation of the ending of
textile quotas as required by WTO obligations, a Tremex company invests a
substantial amount in distribution facilities in the United States. However,
before the WTO compliance deadline, the United States responds to pressure
from domestic interests and announces that the quotas will stay in place inde-
finitely. The Tremex government can challenge this action at the WTO and
would probably win in Dispute Resolution Body proceedings that could take
three or more years.
However, even if the Tremex government does win and achieves eventual
withdrawal of the quotas, there is no compensation under the WTO agreements
for the losses incurred by the Tremex investor during the period when the
quotas were in effect. The WTO system focuses on trade damage to the
economy of members and the balance of concessions negotiated, not on injury
to individuals or corporations. There is no provision for damages to private
parties even though they are the purported beneficiaries of WTO obligations.'0
Suppose though that there is a BIT between the United States and Tremex
with investor protection provisions identical to NAFTA Chapter 11. In these
circumstances, would the investor have a basis to request arbitration before
ICSID or under UNCITRAL rules (or whatever venue is available) claiming that
the failure to eliminate the quota was a denial of fair and equitable treatment as
required by customary international law even under the restrictive NAFTA
standard?"
In support of such a claim, the petitioner would point out that the WTO
Agreement clearly states that the multilateral trade agreements "are integral
parts of this Agreement, binding on all members."' 2 Further, the petitioner
would cite Article XVI.4, which provides that "[E]ach member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." These obligations are
mandatory even though it could be argued that WTO commitments are not
"binding" because a WTO member can ignore an obligation even if the
10. For example, GATT Article XI confers "trading rights" in the sense that exporters from a WTO
country have the "right" to market access in other member countries except as constrained by WTO consistent
measures. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,224. However, exporters
that are denied market access have no right to enforce these rights at the WTO. Id. 224-25.
11. That is, fair and equitable treatment as interpreted by the FTC.
12. WTO Agreement art. H., para. 2 (emphasis added).
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consequence is retaliation following dispute resolution proceedings. 3 This
argument, however, is NOT consistent with the clear directive of the WTO
Agreement, as it must be construed under the Vienna Convention. Nor is it con-
sistent with the conclusion of Professor John Jackson that there is an inter-
national law obligation to implement WTO dispute resolution determinations. 4
The petitioner could thus argue that the principle that emerges from the
WTO Agreements is this: WTO members not only have an obligation to follow
the substantive WTO obligations, but also to implement those rules and
regulations in domestic legislation. While the substantive rules and regulations
would not themselves necessarily be deemed customary international law, the
obligation to implement them would be. This is essentially the claim advanced
in Canfor v. United States, where the complainant argues that the failure to
follow WTO Dispute Resolution Body decisions in the administration of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws by the Department of Commerce was
a denial of fair and equitable treatment. Under the FTC interpretation, this argu-
ment would only be valid if the obligation to implement WTO rules, as inter-
preted by dispute resolution panels, is derived from customary international law.
It is not, of course, sufficient to simply claim that a principle is customary
international law. There are well-established but not always clear or easily
applied criteria for the identification of customary international law that have
evolved and need to be evaluated. What follows is a preliminary and hopefully
not too superficial effort to analyze whether WTO obligations can be deemed
principles of customary international law, which, if violated, would constitute
a denial of fair and equitable treatment under the restrictive NAFTA definition.
In Methanex, the claimant argued that many "international tribunals and
scholars have recognized that treaty provisions, if widely adopted, can become
a source of customary international law." It continued that since the "least-
restrictive measure principle" has been adopted by more than 100 countries in
the WTO agreement, "it has become a part of customary international law."' 5
Thus, the claimant in Methanex contends that multilateral treaties or trade agree-
ments can create new customary international law (as contrasted to codification
of existing customary international law).'6
13. In defending the 1994 Uruguay Round agreements, the United States Trade Representative
claimed there would be no loss of sovereignty if the Agreements were implemented precisely on this ground.
See USTR Statement on the URAA.
14. John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to
Obey or Option to Buy Out?, 98 AM. J. INT'L LAw 109 (2004).
15. Claimant Rejoinder 157, Methanex v. United States (2004) (Arguing that the "least restrictive"
principle is found in several of the multilateral WTO Agreements, including GATT 1994, Article XX.).
16. This is a key distinction since there are authorities that argue that only treaties that codify
existing customary international law are evidence thereof. See e.g., Richard Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 B.Y.1.L 275 (1965-66).
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The Methanex Rejoinder accurately argues that multilateral treaty
obligations can "create" customary international law under current theory. 7
Section 102(3) of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States provides that: "(3) International Agreements create law for the states
party thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when
such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted." The Comments to Section 102 elaborate on his articulation
of the contemporary role of treaties in the creation of customary international
law as follows:
International agreements constitute practice of states and as such can
contribute to the growth of customary law. Some multilateral agree-
ments may come to be law for non-parties that do not actively dissent.
That may be the effect where a multilateral agreement is designed for
adherence by states generally, is widely accepted, and is not rejected
by a significant number of important states. A wide network of
similar bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute practice
and also result in customary law. 8
The WTO Agreements fit precisely into this framework:
1) They are designed for adherence generally;
2) Are widely accepted; and
3) Have not rejected by a significant number of important states.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has also held that treaty obliga-
tions can become customary international law. In Methanex, both the claimant
and the United States rely on the ICJ decision in North Sea Continental Shelf,
ICJ (1969). According to the Court, a treaty can create customary international
law when it concerns a
norm-creating provision which has constituted the foundation, or has
generated a rule which, while only commercial or contractual in its
origin, has since passed into the general corpus of international law
and is now accepted as such by the opiniojuris, so as to have become
binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become
parties to the convention. 19
17. Id. Baxter disagrees, but his views now seem to be in the minority.
18. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(i) (1987).
19. Claimant Rejoinder 1 71, Methanex.
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The ICJ went on to observe that this process is "one of the recognized
methods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed,"
and which from "time to time occur.
20
While not a model of clarity, the North Sea Continental Shelf decision
seem to require the following before a treaty can be said to create new
customary law:
i) There must be a norm-creating provision that has passed into
the general corpus of international law;
ii) The provision must be accepted by the opinio juris; and
iii) As such, is deemed binding on states that are not parties to the
convention/treaty.
In Methanex, the claimant cited North Sea Continental Shelf and other
authorities as support for its claim that WTO principles are customary inter-
national law; that the least restrictive principle was long accepted by GATT; and
that it was explicitly adopted by more than 100 states.2 The Legal Adviser
disagreed, and argued that the "least restrictive principle," as well as the treaty
provisions relied on by the claimant "are not the type of norm-creating
provisions" the ICJ had in mind in North Sea Continental Shelf.2 The Legal
Adviser goes on to argue that there are no international tribunal decisions or
other authorities that find the principle to be part of customary international law.
In addition, it was argued that trade agreements are not suitable to be considered
customary international law because they involve a balance of concessions and
assumption of obligations as opposed to norm-creating provisions.
The Legal Adviser's arguments never explain why the WTO agreements
are not "fundamentally norm-creating provisions., 23 Its arguments suggest there
is a standard test for identifying norm-creating provisions that the WTO
agreements do not meet. But, this test is not articulated, which is not surprising
since there is a paucity of authority on this point. Indeed, a report by the Inter-
national Law Association concludes that this "phrase does not seem to have any
antecedents in international law, and the Court was somewhat Delphic about
what it had in mind. '24 The report continued that "it can be inferred that what
it [the ICJ] meant was that the rule [at issue] did not have the degree of
20. Id.
21. Claimant Rejoinder 157, Methanex.
22. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
594-98, (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 2001).
23. Id.
24. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOC., COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
FINAL REPORT: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (2000).
generality and compulsoriness that it thought necessary."25 That, is, there were
so many reservations to the treaty being considered that it could not be of a
"fundamentally norm creating character." 26 Brownlie seems to agree with the
ILA interpretation, but states that "with respect, it may be doubted if the exis-
tence of reservations of itself destroys the probative value of treaty provi-
sions. 27
Approached from this vantage, one could argue that the requirement of the
WTO Agreement that "each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws with
its WTO obligations '' 28 is a "norm-creating" provision. While this obligation
was "commercial or contractual" in origin, it is now arguably in the "general
corpus" of international law. To begin with, the WTO Agreement and the
obligation to implement its provisions are not generally subject to reservation.
True, there are special rules for developing countries and accession agreements
often delay full implementation by new members. However, these exceptions
are hardly of the same magnitude or character as the reservations referred to in
the ICJ North Sea Continental Shelfopinion. Moreover, the WTO Agreements
are "intended for adherence by states generally" as required by the Restatement,
which enhances their "norm-creating" status.29
The opiniojuris argument is more problematic. Relying on this point, the
Legal Adviser's Rejoinder in Methanex contends that there was no evidence that
any state not a member of the WTO had adopted the least restrictive principle.
The Legal Adviser further argues that the only relevant state practice is that of
non-participants "for only the practice of such States can clearly evidence a
belief that the principle at issue is binding as a rule of customary, rather than
conventional, international law."3 This analysis of the practice of non-party
states is necessary, according to the Legal Adviser, to demonstrate "a general
recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved."'"
The Legal Adviser's argument arguably overstates the role of the practice
of states not a party to the treaty/convention. For example, the Restatement
provides that wide acceptance of a treaty obligation is important, as is the fact
that the treaty/convention "is not rejected by a significant number of important
25. Id.
26. See MA Report at 52.
27. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 13 (4th ed. 1990).
28. WTO Agreement art. XVI, para. 10.
29. Another commentator has argued that the North Sea Continental Shelf test for the creation of
new customary law is based on intent. "If the treaty manifests an intent to have a particular provision create
customary law, that manifested intent is controlling." Anthony D'Amato, Manifest Intent and the Generation
by Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law, 64 AM. J. INT'L LAW 892, 896 (1970).
30. Claimant Rejoinder, Methanex cites North Sea Continental Shelf (Judgment), 1969 I.C.J. 3,43,
74 (Feb. 20).
31. Id.
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states. 32 In the case of the WTO, there are 148 member states, which is
evidence that the WTO Agreement is "widely-accepted," as required by the
Restatement. This wide acceptance is further evidenced by the fact that 25
additional states (including Saudi Arabia and Russia)33 are in the accession pro-
cess. These non-member states therefore would also appear to accept the bind-
ing effect of WTO obligations. Indeed, no major state has rejected the WTO
agreements and only a few (including North Korea) have not applied for
accession or observer status. (Iraq and Libya are among the few states that are
observers but not accession applicants.)
This almost universal acceptance of the WTO obligations would appear to
satisfy the North Sea Continental Shelf requirement of "a very widespread and
representative participation in the convention.., provided it includes States
whose interests were specifically affected."34 Indeed, with the accession of
China and the approaching access of Russia, it would appear reasonable to argue
that the WTO membership is "functionally universal."
Finally, the WTO Agreement has now been in effect for ten years. During
this period, accessions have occurred almost monthly as the pool of member
states has rapidly been enlarged. No country has withdrawn its accession.
While the Legal Adviser argued in Methanex that the (then) six years since the
WTO Agreement was adopted was not a "considerable"35 period of time, it is
now plausible to argue that the WTO has passed the test of time. Indeed, in
North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ stated that "even without the passage of
any considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative partici-
pation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it included that of
States whose interests were specifically affected."36 Moreover, Brownlie states
that: "Provided the consistency and generality of a practice are proved, no
particular duration is required: the passage of time will of course be a part of
the evidence of generality and consistency.
37
Even if certain customary law principles can be said to have evolved from
the WTO Agreements, a question remains about their applicability to NAFTA
Article 1105 claims. Shortly after the FTC interpretation was adopted, Canada
took the position in Mondev that the meaning of fair and equitable treatment
was to be derived from the decision "of the Mexican Claims Commission in the
32. Claimant Rejoinder 102, Methanex.
33. Russia has undertaken ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to obtain EU support for the Russian
accession application. Guy Chazan, Russia to Move Closer to Joining Kyoto Accord, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
2004, at A6.
34. See North Sea Continental Shelf 1969 I.C.J. at 43, 73.
35. Id. 173.
36. Id. 73-74.
37. BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 5.
Neer case., 38 The tribunal rejected this contention, noting that the "United
States itself accepted that Article 1105(1) is intended to provide a real measure
of protection of investments, and that having regard to its general language and
to the evolutionary character of international law, it has evolutionary
potential. 39 Summing up, the tribunal concluded that the term customary
international law in the FTC interpretation "refers to customary international
law as it stood no earlier than the time at which NAFTA came into force." 40
The Mondev analysis leaves open the question whether customary inter-
national law that has been created after 1994 can be referred to in addressing
claims that NAFTA country actions amount to a denial of fair and equitable
treatment. NAFTA and the WTO came into effect the same year (1994).
Hence, the practice of the large number of states that have joined the WTO since
1994 could be cited as evidence that they did not deem themselves bound by
WTO "norm-creating" provisions as of 1994. In addition, the U.S. could argue
that even if it accepted the "evolutionary" character of customary international
law prior to 1994, subsequent evolution of that law would not be binding or
relevant to Article 1105(1) claims.
While the U.S. (and the other NAFTA governments) may claim it would
be unreasonable to conclude that the NAFTA parties entered into commitments
in 1994 that could be modified by the evolution of the meaning of fair and
equitable treatment, it seems unlikely that tribunals would not be sympathetic
to this argument. Both the Restatement and the North Sea Continental Shelf
decision recognize that customary international law is evolutionary and the
NAFTA governments can hardly claim they were unaware of this when the FTC
interpretation expressly referencing customary international law was adopted.
38. Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 114 (2002).
39. Id. 119.
40. Id. 125.
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